Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59485
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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGang, Ira N.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T11:57:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T11:57:32Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59485-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we try to understand the phenomena whereby a large proportion of the population evades tax payments. We present a model which incorporates elements from the theory of information cascades with the standard model of tax evasion and analyze the connection between the decision of a potential tax evader, the number of tax evaders and the number caught in previous periods. General conditions exist under which any expected utility maximizing potential tax evaders will decide to emulate other tax evaders.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey |cNew Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |x2009,02en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelH31en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation cascadesen_US
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuervermeidungen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerkriminalit├Ąten_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwErwartungsnutzenen_US
dc.subject.stwHerdenverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWhy pay taxes when no one else does?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612503011en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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