Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59483 
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dc.contributor.authorBaliga, Sandeepen
dc.contributor.authorSjostrom, Tomasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T11:57:30Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T11:57:30Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59483-
dc.description.abstractStag hunt and chicken games are canonical representations of two kinds of strategic interactions. In stag hunt, aggression feeds on itself, and mutual fear escalates into conflict. Chicken is a model of preemption and deterrence. With complete information, these games have multiple Nash equilbria. Using standard arguments from the Industrial Organization literature, we find sufficient conditions under which payoff uncertainty generates a unique equilibrium. These conditions encompass information structures ranging from independent types (as in our previous work) to highly correlated types (as in global games).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2009-05en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleConflict games with payoff uncertainty-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn61250381Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:200905en

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