Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58957
Authors: 
Auriol, Emmanuelle
Friebel, Guido
Lammers, Frauke
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6343
Abstract: 
We suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns. A firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker's status depends on past performance. We investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies: (i) internal labor markets, in which agents have a job guarantee, and (ii) up-or-out, in which agents are fired when unsuccessful. We show that up-or-out is optimal if success is difficult to achieve. When success is less hard to achieve, an internal labor market is optimal provided the payoffs associated with success are moderate. Otherwise, up-or-out is, again, optimal. These results are in line with observations from academia, law firms, investment banks and top consulting firms. Here, up-or-out dominates, while internal labor markets dominate where work is less demanding or payoffs are more compressed, for instance, because the environment is less competitive. We present some supporting evidence from academia, comparing US with French economics departments.
Subjects: 
status
promotion hierarchies
incentives
sorting
JEL: 
J3
M5
L2
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
601.81 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.