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dc.contributor.authorAskenazy, Philippeen
dc.contributor.authorCette, Gilberten
dc.contributor.authorMaarek, Paulen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-16-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T07:58:33Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-15T07:58:33Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201207126998en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58944-
dc.description.abstractThrough panel estimates using OECD country-industry statistics, this paper aims to clarify the determinants of rent creation and the mechanisms of rent sharing, and the role of market regulations in these processes. The empirical analysis is carried out in two steps. The first explains the rent creation process. For each country-industry-year observation, the size of rents, measured by the value added price relative to the GDP price, is assumed to depend solely on direct anti-competitive regulations on services and goods. The second step explains the rent sharing process. Three destinations of rents are distinguished for each country-industry-year observation: upstream industries, capital and labour. The main empirical findings are as follows. Regarding the rent creation, direct anti-competitive regulations are associated with a very significant rise in rent size. Concerning the rent sharing, the capital share in value added appears to i) increase with rent size, decrease with anti-competitive regulation in upstream sectors and increase with the industry specific output gap; ii) decrease with the national output gap, increase with the national employment rate and decrease with employment protection regulation; iii) increase with the interaction of rent size and the unemployment rate and decrease with the interaction of rent size and employment protection regulations. These results confirm the existence of three destinations for rents. They also show that the magnitude of each destination depends on the market power of its beneficiary. All these results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x6443en
dc.subject.jelE25en
dc.subject.jelJ20en
dc.subject.jelJ30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordrentsen
dc.subject.keywordcapital shareen
dc.subject.keywordpricesen
dc.subject.keywordmarket regulationsen
dc.subject.keywordoutput gapen
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten
dc.subject.stwRententheorieen
dc.subject.stwGewinnquoteen
dc.subject.stwBrancheen
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwGesamtwirtschaftliche Produktionen
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwGroßbritannienen
dc.titleRent building, rent sharing: A panel country-industry empirical analysis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn71580314Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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