Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58827
Authors: 
Akee, Randall K. Q.
Bedi, Arjun S.
Basu, Arnab K.
Chau, Nancy
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6226
Abstract: 
We explore three hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human trafficking market - the cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers, the relative bargaining strength of traffickers and final buyers, and the elasticity of buyers' demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking present evidence consistent with the mutual reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease of mobility, partial bargaining power, and inelastic demand.
Subjects: 
human trafficking
two-way Nash bargaining
victim protection
law enforcement
JEL: 
K42
R23
O15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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