Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58796
Authors: 
Cahuc, Pierre
Charlot, Olivier
Malherbet, Franck
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6365
Abstract: 
This paper provides a simple model which explains the choice between permanent and temporary jobs. This model, which incorporates important features of actual employment protection legislations neglected by the economic literature so far, reproduces the main stylized facts about entries into permanent and temporary jobs observed in Continental European countries. We show that the stringency of legal constraints on the termination of permanent jobs has a strong positive impact on the turnover of temporary jobs. We also find that job protection has very small effects on total employment but induces large substitution of temporary jobs for permanent jobs which significantly reduces aggregate production.
Subjects: 
temporary jobs
employment protection legislation
JEL: 
J63
J64
J68
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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