Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58746 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 6265
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Altruism among family members can, in some cases, inhibit cooperation by increasing the utility that players expect to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. To test this, we examine agricultural productivity in polygynous households in West Africa. We find that cooperation is greater - production is more efficient - among co-wives than among husbands and wives because co-wives are less altruistic towards each other. The results are not driven by scale effects or self-selection into polygyny. Nor can they be explained by greater propensity for cooperation among women generally or by the household head acting as an enforcement mechanism for others' cooperative agreements.
Subjects: 
altruism
non-cooperative behavior
household bargaining
polygyny
Africa
JEL: 
D13
D70
J12
O13
O55
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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