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dc.contributor.authorRobin, Stéphaneen
dc.contributor.authorRusinowska, Agnieszkaen
dc.contributor.authorVilleval, Marie Claireen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-23-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T07:44:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-15T07:44:32Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2012081412625en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58573-
dc.description.abstractWe provide experimental evidence of workers' by opinion conformity and of managers' discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers' performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal payoffs. In the Ingratiation treatment, workers can change their opinion after learning that held by the manager. In the Random treatment, workers can also change opinion but payoffs are assigned randomly, which gives a measure of non-strategic opinion conformism. We find evidence of high ingratiation indices, as overall, ingratiation is effective. Indeed, managers reward opinion conformity, and even more so when opinions cannot be manipulated. Additional treatments reveal that ingratiation is cost sensitive and that the introduction of performance pay for managers as well as a less noisy measure of performance increase the role of relative performance in the assignment of payoffs, without eliminating the reward of opinion conformity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x6530en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelM51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordingratiationen
dc.subject.keywordopinion conformityen
dc.subject.keywordfavoritismen
dc.subject.keyworddiscriminationen
dc.subject.keywordsocial distanceen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.stwLeistungsentgelten
dc.subject.stwLohndifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwMeinungen
dc.subject.stwPatronageen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleIngratiation and favoritism: Experimental evidence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715998005en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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