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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 6304
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an incentive effect from raising the winner's prize. However, we also observed several empirical puzzles that appeared to contradict theory. Controlling for social preferences did not resolve the puzzles, although social preferences do influence behavior. It turns out that the puzzles can be explained by the canonical model once the textbook assumption of separable agent utility is relaxed.
Schlagwörter: 
tournaments
experiment
social preferences
contract theory
JEL: 
D03
D82
D86
M52
M55
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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