Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58517
Authors: 
Powdthavee, Nattavudh
Riyanto, Yohanes E.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6557
Abstract: 
We investigated experimentally whether people can be induced to believe in a non-existent expert, and subsequently pay for what can only be described as transparently useless advice about future chance events. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010), we show empirically that the answer is yes and that the size of the error made systematically by people is large.
Subjects: 
gambler's fallacy
hot-hand
random streak
expertise
information
JEL: 
C91
D03
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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