Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58388
Authors: 
Bonanno, Giacomo
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 10,17
Abstract: 
We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency, which has an epistemic justification based on the AGM theory of belief revision.
Subjects: 
belief revision
plausibility order
consistency
subgame-perfect
equilibrium
sequential equilibrium
Bayesian updating
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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