Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58374
Authors: 
Meier, Martin
Schipper, Burkhard
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 12,9
Abstract: 
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness.
Subjects: 
Unawareness
Awareness
Type-space
Incomplete information
Bayesian
games
Equilibrium
Perfection
Undominated equilibrium
Weak dominance
Inattention
JEL: 
C70
C72
D80
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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