Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58374 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkhard C.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:33:40Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:33:40Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58374-
dc.description.abstractApplying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of California, Department of Economics |cDavis, CAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x12-9en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordUnawarenessen
dc.subject.keywordAwarenessen
dc.subject.keywordType-spaceen
dc.subject.keywordIncomplete informationen
dc.subject.keywordBayesianen
dc.subject.keywordgamesen
dc.subject.keywordEquilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordPerfectionen
dc.subject.keywordUndominated equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordWeak dominanceen
dc.subject.keywordInattentionen
dc.titleBayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn717284026en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
592.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.