Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58372
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dc.contributor.authorBonanno, Giacomoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:33:38Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:33:38Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58372-
dc.description.abstractIn a companion paper we introduced a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency. In this paper we provide an epistemic foundation for AGM-consistency based on the AGM theory of belief revision.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Univ. of California |cDavis, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers, University of California, Department of Economics |x11,1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbelief revisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon prioren_US
dc.subject.keywordplausibility orderen_US
dc.subject.keywordperfect Bayesian equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordconsistencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsequential equilibriumen_US
dc.titlePerfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn717274640en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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