Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58370 
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dc.contributor.authorHeifetz, Aviaden
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkhard C.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:33:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:33:35Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58370-
dc.description.abstractWe define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized No-trade theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the No-agreeing-to-disagree theorem.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of California, Department of Economics |cDavis, CAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x09-20en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordunawarenessen
dc.subject.keywordawarenessen
dc.subject.keywordzero probabilityen
dc.subject.keywordtype-spaceen
dc.subject.keywordcommon prioren
dc.subject.keywordagreementen
dc.subject.keywordspeculative tradeen
dc.subject.keywordinteractive epistemologyen
dc.titleUnawareness, beliefs and speculative trade-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn612520889en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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