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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2012-104
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.
Schlagwörter: 
conflict
contest
alliance
hold-up problem
experiment
JEL: 
D72
D74
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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