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dc.contributor.authorKe, Changxiaen
dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.contributor.authorMorath, Florianen
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-05-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-11T10:53:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-11T10:53:27Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350-
dc.description.abstractVictorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2012-104en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keywordcontesten
dc.subject.keywordallianceen
dc.subject.keywordhold-up problemen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.stwKonflikten
dc.subject.stwBündnissystemen
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleAlliances in the shadow of conflict-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn717085090en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012104en

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