Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58349
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dc.contributor.authorGeys, Bennyen
dc.contributor.authorMause, Karstenen
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-05-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-11T10:53:25Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-11T10:53:25Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58349-
dc.description.abstractMembers of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2012-105en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwAbgeordneteen
dc.subject.stwNebentätigkeiten
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleDelegation, accountability & legislator moonlighting: Agency problems in Germany-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn717085457en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012105en

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