Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58345 
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dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten
dc.contributor.authorTichem, Janen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-31-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-08T13:57:28Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-08T13:57:28Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58345-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3826en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelM55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen
dc.subject.keywordspiteen
dc.subject.keywordsocial relationsen
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordrelational contractsen
dc.subject.keywordefficiency wagesen
dc.subject.keywordsubjective performance evaluationen
dc.subject.keywordNash bargainingen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbeziehungenen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSocial relations and relational incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn716601540en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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