Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57955 
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dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien
dc.contributor.authorPoutvaara, Panuen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-16-
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-21T10:06:51Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-21T10:06:51Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57955-
dc.description.abstractGovernment or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the nomination is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3810en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.jelD52en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.jelH57en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnominationsen
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen
dc.subject.keywordnetworksen
dc.subject.keywordpoliticiansen
dc.subject.keywordprocurementen
dc.titleA market for connections-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715780948en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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