Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57950
Authors: 
Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3811
Abstract: 
This paper studies the effects on electoral competition of political parties relying on monetary donations and volunteer labour for their electioneering activities. It also examines whether a recorded decline in party activism increases special-interest influence on party policy platforms. Parties are shown to choose differentiated platforms in equilibrium when activists are present, despite factors drawing them together. Special-interest influence on platforms increases when a decline in activism stems from a fall in their motivation, following parties relying less upon them. This reduces procedural welfare, and potentially reduces voter welfare on policy outcomes, thus calling for more strict electoral laws.
Subjects: 
activism
special-interest politics
political participation
collective action
electoral competition
electoral financing laws
welfare
JEL: 
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.