Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57816
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dc.contributor.authorJerger, Jürgenen_US
dc.contributor.authorMichaelis, Jochenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-09T10:02:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-09T10:02:57Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-938980-32-3en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57816-
dc.description.abstractIt is well known that profit sharing arrangements Pareto-dominate fixed wage contracts. Share agreements are (far) less than ubiquitous, however. This paper offers a solution of this fixed wage puzzle by adopting a perspective of bounded rationality. We show that share arrangements that fulfill plausible constraints are not generally acceptable to both firms and unions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aOsteuropa-Inst. |cRegensburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aArbeiten aus dem Osteuropa-Institut Regensburg |x283en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwLohnbildungen_US
dc.subject.stwErfolgsbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe fixed wage puzzle: Why profit sharing is so hard to implementen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn625798899en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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