Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57749
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dc.contributor.authorNiessen, Alexandraen_US
dc.contributor.authorRuenzi, Stefanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-02T15:45:33Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-02T15:45:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57749-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates politically connected firms in Germany. With the introduction of a new transparency law in 2007, information on additional income sources for all members of the German parliament became publicly available. We find that members of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the liberal party (FDP) are more likely to work for firms than members of left-wing parties (SPD and The Left) or the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens). Politically connected firms are larger, less risky, and have lower market valuations than unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On the stock market, connected firms significantly outperform unconnected firms in 2006, i.e. prior to the publication of the data on political connections. Differences in stock market performance are much smaller in 2007.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCentre for Financial Research |cCologneen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFR Working Paper |x07-15en_US
dc.subject.jelG14en_US
dc.subject.jelG18en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.jelG38en_US
dc.subject.jelH89en_US
dc.subject.jelK29en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Connectednessen_US
dc.subject.keywordFirm Valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordFirm Performanceen_US
dc.titlePolitical connectedness and firm performance: Evidence from Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn714985635en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfrwps:0715-

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