Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57743 
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dc.contributor.authorvon Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulfen
dc.contributor.authorRuenzi, Stefanen
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-27-
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-02T15:45:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-02T15:45:23Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57743-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance of S&P 500 (S&P 1500) firms from 1994-2005 (1996-2005). We find that firms in which the CEO holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by up to 16% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors like size, book-to-market and momentum. This offers an explanation why so many CEOs hold a large fraction of their own company's stocks. They do so simply because it pays. We also examine several potential explanations why the existence of an owner CEO is not fully priced but leads to abnormal returns.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR) |cCologneen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFR Working Paper |x06-11en
dc.subject.jelG12en
dc.subject.jelG30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCEO-Ownershipen
dc.subject.keywordAsset Pricing with large shareholdersen
dc.titleWhy managers hold shares of their firm: An empirical analysis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn702963070en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfrwps:0611en

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