Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57743
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dc.contributor.authorvon Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulfen_US
dc.contributor.authorRuenzi, Stefanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-02T15:45:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-02T15:45:23Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57743-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance of S&P 500 (S&P 1500) firms from 1994-2005 (1996-2005). We find that firms in which the CEO holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by up to 16% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors like size, book-to-market and momentum. This offers an explanation why so many CEOs hold a large fraction of their own company's stocks. They do so simply because it pays. We also examine several potential explanations why the existence of an owner CEO is not fully priced but leads to abnormal returns.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCentre for Financial Research |cCologneen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFR Working Paper |x06-11en_US
dc.subject.jelG12en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCEO-Ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsset Pricing with large shareholdersen_US
dc.titleWhy managers hold shares of their firm: An empirical analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn702963070en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfrwps:0611-

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