Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57635
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNeumärker, Bernharden_US
dc.contributor.authorPech, Geralden_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-26T14:45:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-26T14:45:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57635-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. We identify a unique limit equilibrium where the poorest citizens evade, intermediate citizens are honest and the richest citizens are indifferent between evading and truth-telling. For small tax rates and auditing cost, committing to a discretionary punishment relief scheme increases expected tax revenue.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aAlbert-Ludwigs-Univ. Freiburg |cFreiburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aThe Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers |x01-2010en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal punishmenten_US
dc.titlePenalties in the theory of equilibrium tax evasion: Solving King John's problemen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn699902355en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cenwps:012010-

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.