Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57574
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dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden
dc.contributor.authorMeijboom, Robinen
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-31-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T15:45:10Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T15:45:10Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:27-20110630-112051-8en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57574-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilities depend on the history of the play, i.e., the players' past action choices. To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward criterion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards which can be supported by equilibria involving threats. We examine the following setting for motivational and expository purposes. Each period, two agents exploiting a fishery choose between catching with restraint or without. The fish stock is in either of two states, High or Low, and in the latter each action pair yields lower payoffs. Restraint is harmless to the fish, but it is a dominated strategy in each stage game. Absence of restraint damages the resource, i.e., the less restraint the agents show, the higher the probablities that Low occurs at the next stage of the play. This state may even become absorbing, i.e., transitions to High become impossible.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers on Economics and Evolution |x1024en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelQ22en
dc.subject.jelQ57en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordstochastic gamesen
dc.subject.keywordendogenous transitionsen
dc.subject.keywordlimiting average rewardsen
dc.subject.keywordequilibriaen
dc.subject.keywordcommon pool resource dilemmaen
dc.subject.stwStochastisches Spielen
dc.subject.stwAllmenderessourceen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleStochastic games with endogenous transitions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn644896744en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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