Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57561
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHausman, Daniel M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T15:44:45Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T15:44:45Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57561-
dc.description.abstractContemporary mainstream normative economists assess policies in terms of their capacities to satisfy preferences, though most would concede that other factors such as freedom, rights, and justice are also relevant. Why should policy be responsive to preferences? This essay argues that the best reason is that people's preferences are in some circumstances good evidence of what will benefit them. When those circumstances do not obtain and preferences are not good evidence of welfare, there is little reason to satisfy preferences.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax-Planck-Inst. für Ökonomik |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPapers on economics and evolution |x1124en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwKritiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWhy satisfy preferences?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn68292167Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
634.98 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.