Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57521
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ganuza, Juan José | en |
dc.contributor.author | Jansen, Jos | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-10-15 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-24T11:05:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-24T11:05:58Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57521 | - |
dc.description.abstract | By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists' information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade-off in Cournot oligopoly. On the one hand, it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision, as the literature shows. On the other hand, information sharing increases the firms' incentives to acquire information, and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms' information. Interestingly, the latter effect may dominate the former effect. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,40 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L40 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D83 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | oligopoly | en |
dc.subject.keyword | information acquisition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | information sharing | en |
dc.subject.keyword | information structures | en |
dc.subject.keyword | consumer surplus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Oligopol | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wissenstransfer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Informationsverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konsumentenrente | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Too much information sharing? Welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 636810267 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.