Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57514
Authors: 
Bierbrauer, Felix
Boyer, Pierre C.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,45
Abstract: 
We study Downsian competition in a Mirrleesian model of income taxation. The competing politicians may differ in competence. If politicians engage in vote-share maximization, the less competent politician's policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents, whereas those of the competent politician are attractive to the majority of poor agents. The less competent politician wins with positive probability, which gives rise to a political failure in the sense of Besley and Coate (1998). Political failures are avoided if politicians maximize winning probabilities. Nevertheless, the two equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked, the minority may be better off under vote-share maximization.
Subjects: 
Electoral Competition
Non-linear Income Taxation
Candidate Quality
JEL: 
H21
C72
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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