Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57512 
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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen
dc.contributor.authorPluta, Alicjaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-12-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:05:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:05:42Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57512-
dc.description.abstractLegal realists expect prosecutors to be selfish. If they get the defendant convicted, this helps them advance their careers. If the odds of winning on the main charge are low, prosecutors have a second option. They can exploit the ambiguity of legal doctrine and charge the defendant for vaguely defined crimes, like conspiracy. We model the situation as a signalling game and test it experimentally. If we have participants play the naked game, at least a minority plays the game theoretic equilibrium and use the vague rule if a signal indicates that the defendant is guilty. This becomes even slightly more frequent if a misbehaving defendant imposes harm on a third participant. By contrast if we frame the situation as a court case, almost all prosecutors take the signal at face value and knowingly run the risk of loosing in court if the signal was false. Our experimental prosecutors behave like textbook legal idealists, and follow the urge of duty.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2011,14en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelK14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen
dc.subject.keywordprosecutionen
dc.subject.keyworddoctrinal ambiguityen
dc.subject.keywordvaguely defined crimesen
dc.subject.keyworddutyen
dc.subject.keywordDOSPERTen
dc.subject.stwJustizen
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleThe people's hired guns? Experimentally testing the inclination of prosecutors to abuse the vague definition of crimes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn66403506Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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