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dc.contributor.authorCasella, Alessandraen
dc.contributor.authorLlorente-Saguer, Aniolen
dc.contributor.authorPalfrey, Thomas R.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-24-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:38Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:38Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57479-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium, and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibriumwe characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade, and the market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the distribution of values not very skewed. We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2012,03en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.jelP16en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen
dc.subject.keywordVotingen
dc.subject.keywordMarketsen
dc.subject.keywordVote Tradingen
dc.subject.keywordCompetitive Equilibriumen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.titleCompetitive equilibrium in markets for votes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn687469368en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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