Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57477 
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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen
dc.contributor.authorZhurakhovska, Liliaen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-16-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:34Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57477-
dc.description.abstractIf two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemma hold standard prefer-ences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is imma-terial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on the outsider. This is not what we find, however severe the externality. A within-subjects measure of reticence to impose harm does not explain cooperation. But the externality makes participants more pessimistic. However conditional on their beliefs participants are more, not less cooperative if cooperation entails harm on an outsider, again however severe the externality.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2012,02en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexternalityen
dc.subject.keywordprisoner's dilemmaen
dc.subject.keywordmodified dictator gameen
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleHarm on an innocent outsider as a lubricant of cooperation: An experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn685539385en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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