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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2011,31
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only depend on the population share of people in favour of provision. Robust implementability and coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi cation with more than two public-good provision levels.
Schlagwörter: 
Mechanism Design
Public-good provision
Large Economy
Voting Mechanisms
JEL: 
D82
H41
D70
D60
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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