Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57285
Authors: 
Hansen, Stephen
McMahon, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Monetary Policy and International Finance 3782
Abstract: 
We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasing confidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal their hawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns or pleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The paper suggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explaining dynamics in experts' policy choices.
Subjects: 
signalling
learning
monetary policy
JEL: 
D78
E52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
459.61 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.