Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57123
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dc.contributor.authorSchmielewski, Franken_US
dc.contributor.authorWein, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-17T12:53:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-17T12:53:57Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57123-
dc.description.abstractIn this study, we propose our hypothesis that the distinguishable principal-agent relationships of German banks are significantly influencing the risk-taking attitudes of bank managers. Particularly, we intend to substantiate the theory that banks owned by dispersed shareholders or federal state authorities face a higher relevance of principal-agent problems than other banking sectors due to a missing ability to monitor bank managers. Our results underline that these problems appear to mislead bank managers showing an unreasonable risk-taking behavior. In a first stage, we rely on a theoretical model explaining that from the bank owners' viewpoint three factors of the principal-agent relationships are determining the probability of choosing the optimal portfolio of risky assets. These factors cover the ability to control bank managers, the risk pooling capabilities of bank owners and bank managers, and the incentives of seeking high returns. To support our hypothesis we apply an empirical study to the distances-to-default of different German banking sectors. This demonstrates that risktaking attitudes of banks are closely related to banks' ownership. Consequently, our findings offer evidence, that legislative and regulatory authorities should increase their vigilance in terms of principal-agent problems within certain sectors of the banking industry.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cLüneburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aUniversity of Lüneburg Working Paper Series in Economics |x236en_US
dc.subject.jelG01en_US
dc.subject.jelG12en_US
dc.subject.jelG14en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.jelG15en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancial crisesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk-taking behavioren_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordefficient portfoliosen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation asymmetries and market efficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernment policy and regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk poolingen_US
dc.subject.keywordseeking for high returnsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonitoring capabilitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcapital and ownership structureen_US
dc.subject.keyworddistance-to-defaulten_US
dc.subject.keywordcapital asset ratioen_US
dc.subject.keywordreturn on assetsen_US
dc.titleAre private banks the better banks? An insight into the principal-agent structure and risk-taking behavior of German banksen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn689598300en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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