Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Schmielewski, Frank
Wein, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series in Economics 236
In this study, we propose our hypothesis that the distinguishable principal-agent relationships of German banks are significantly influencing the risk-taking attitudes of bank managers. Particularly, we intend to substantiate the theory that banks owned by dispersed shareholders or federal state authorities face a higher relevance of principal-agent problems than other banking sectors due to a missing ability to monitor bank managers. Our results underline that these problems appear to mislead bank managers showing an unreasonable risk-taking behavior. In a first stage, we rely on a theoretical model explaining that from the bank owners' viewpoint three factors of the principal-agent relationships are determining the probability of choosing the optimal portfolio of risky assets. These factors cover the ability to control bank managers, the risk pooling capabilities of bank owners and bank managers, and the incentives of seeking high returns. To support our hypothesis we apply an empirical study to the distances-to-default of different German banking sectors. This demonstrates that risktaking attitudes of banks are closely related to banks' ownership. Consequently, our findings offer evidence, that legislative and regulatory authorities should increase their vigilance in terms of principal-agent problems within certain sectors of the banking industry.
financial crises
risk-taking behavior
risk aversion
efficient portfolios
information asymmetries and market efficiency
government policy and regulation
risk pooling
seeking for high returns
monitoring capabilities
capital and ownership structure
capital asset ratio
return on assets
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
554.69 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.