Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56926
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dc.contributor.authorMontinari, Nataliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:53Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:53Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56926-
dc.description.abstractWhether friendship or competitive relationships deserve to be encouraged in the workplace is not obvious a priori. In this paper we derive the conditions under which a profit-aximizing employer finds it convenient to induce a rat race among workers exhibiting horizontal reciprocity in order to obtain underpaid or unpaid extra effort. We characterize the optimal compensation scheme under both symmetric and asymmetric information about workers' actions, and we also derive conditions for our result to hold in the presence of vertical reciprocity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2011,052en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordextra efforten_US
dc.subject.keywordhorizontal reciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordnegative reciprocityen_US
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwInformationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe dark side of reciprocityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn672442655en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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