Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56926 
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dc.contributor.authorMontinari, Nataliaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-17-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:53Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:53Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56926-
dc.description.abstractWhether friendship or competitive relationships deserve to be encouraged in the workplace is not obvious a priori. In this paper we derive the conditions under which a profit-aximizing employer finds it convenient to induce a rat race among workers exhibiting horizontal reciprocity in order to obtain underpaid or unpaid extra effort. We characterize the optimal compensation scheme under both symmetric and asymmetric information about workers' actions, and we also derive conditions for our result to hold in the presence of vertical reciprocity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2011,052en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordextra efforten
dc.subject.keywordhorizontal reciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordnegative reciprocityen
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en
dc.subject.stwInformationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe dark side of reciprocity-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn672442655en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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