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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56924
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Suzuki, Toru | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-12-08 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-04-11T09:31:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-04-11T09:31:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56924 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective of the prize designer who wishes to find a solution as quick as possible. It is shown that (i) the winner-take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aJena Economic Research Papers |x2010,083 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | optimal prize scheme | en |
dc.subject.keyword | risk taking | en |
dc.subject.keyword | problem solving | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anforderungsprofil | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomischer Anreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Risikopräferenz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 641291116 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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