Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56924
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dc.contributor.authorSuzuki, Toruen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:50Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:50Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56924-
dc.description.abstractAgents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective of the prize designer who wishes to find a solution as quick as possible. It is shown that (i) the winner-take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2010,083en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal prize schemeen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk takingen_US
dc.subject.keywordproblem solvingen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwAnforderungsprofilen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikopräferenzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCompetitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn641291116en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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