Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56923 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2011,039
Publisher: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Abstract: 
In a series of one-shot linear public goods game, we ask subjects to report their contributions, their contribution plans for the next period, and their first-order beliefs about their present and future partner. We estimate subjects' preferences from plans data by a infinite mixture approach and compare the results with those obtained from contribution data. Our results indicate that preferences are heterogeneous, and that most subjects exhibit conditionally cooperative inclinations. Controlling for beliefs, which incorporate the information about the other's decisions, we are able to show that plans convey accurate information about subjects' preferences and, consequently, are good predictors of their future behavior.
Subjects: 
public goods games
experiments
social preferences
mixture models
JEL: 
C35
C51
C72
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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