Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56916 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2011,046
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
In a situation, where it is efficient for one of two parties to pollute but highly inefficient if both parties do so, the harmed third party can freely impose its damage claims on both parties what crucially determines which equilibrium to expect. Whereas 'equality before the law' requires equal punishments, efficient equilibria are predicted when holding one party responsible and letting the other escape punishment. After discussing equilibrium selection for the game, we report on an experiment with two treatment variables: one that determines when the harmed party announces its potential damage claims and one varying a game- and justice-unrelated difference between the two culprits. According to our experimental data, 'equality before the law' dominates but is weakened by asymmetry in wealth and the possibility to announce sanctions.
Schlagwörter: 
law and economics
equality vs. efficiency
equilibrium selection
laboratory experiments
JEL: 
C72
C92
K00
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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