Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56910
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2011,012
Abstract: 
A long time ago most economists would have limited themselves to stating that agreements should be individually rational and efficient and that selecting a specific agreement from that set depends on bargaining and negotiation power whatever that may be. Nowadays hardly any economist will argue that way. The change has been brought about by the strategic approach to bargaining and cooperation and the parallel experimental studies of bargaining and negotiation. When arguing what should be explored more thoroughly, we will point out directions where previous efforts may have been misdirected, where importing new methods may be helpful or even needed, and where new research questions need to be asked and answered.
Subjects: 
(un)bounded rationality
(non-)cooperative game theory
bargaining and negotiation (theory and experiments)
JEL: 
C90
C92
C93
D63
D64
D71
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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