Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56902 
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorLevati, M. Vittoriaen
dc.contributor.authorPloner, Matteoen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-04-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:13Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56902-
dc.description.abstractBidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (fist versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seeking.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2010,073en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen
dc.subject.keywordfair division gamesen
dc.subject.keywordprocedural fairnessen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleDoes procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn638482151en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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