Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56901 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2010,072
Publisher: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Abstract: 
Intentions-based models of social preferences use the framework of psychological games and incorporate higher order beliefs and actions into the utility function. We test the robustness of two types of intentions-based models (guilt aversion and reciprocity). In addition to incentivised elicitation of first- and second-order action beliefs, we assess participants' sensitivity to feel guilt, and their attitude towards acting reciprocal. The data confirm the predictions of intentions-based models. Both second-order beliefs and the weighting factor that depends on a participant's sensitivity to guilt/reciprocity are relevant for the decisions taken. Second-order beliefs appear to have an inverse U-shaped effect on the amount returned.
Subjects: 
social preferences
other-regarding behaviour
experiments
trust game
guilt aversion
beliefs
psychological game theory
emotions
JEL: 
C91
D03
D84
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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