Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56887 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorRegner, Tobiasen
dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-18-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:30:48Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:30:48Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56887-
dc.description.abstractWe construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustor has the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisions either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play sequentially, follower trustees who are informed about the leader's choice are significantly less kind than in the simultaneous move treatment as well as the leader trustees. These findings can not be explained by models of inequity aversion, pure guilt aversion, or conformity. Instead, follower trustees cherry pick the motivation that serves them best. When the leader trustee played unkind, they tend to conform and play unkind, too. When the leader made a kind choice, followers seem to perceive the duty of reciprocating to the trustor as already fulfilled by the leader. While guilt works well as a motivational force in a dyadic situation, it gets alleviated easily when there is someone to shift responsibility to, like the leader in our three person game.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2011,029en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordteam productionen
dc.subject.keywordtrusten
dc.subject.keywordprincipal agenten
dc.subject.keywordguilten
dc.subject.keywordguilt alleviationen
dc.subject.keywordconformityen
dc.subject.keywordfalse consensus effecten
dc.subject.keywordlab experimenten
dc.subject.keywordcherry pickingen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsgruppeen
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleMotivational cherry picking-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn664329160en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
539.63 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.