Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56874
Authors: 
Casal, Sandro
Güth, Werner
Jia, Mofei
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2011,051
Abstract: 
Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share is exogenously fixed. Responders can accept or reject the proposal, with game types differing in the consequences of rejection: all four combinations of (not) self-harming and (not) other-harming are considered. We find that envy leads responders to reject high proposer claims, especially when rejection harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict and results in a considerable loss of efficiency.
Subjects: 
social preferences
conflict
experimental economics
bargaining
JEL: 
D63
D74
C91
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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