Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56872 
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dc.contributor.authorLeibbrandt, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorRamalingam, Abhijiten
dc.contributor.authorSääksvuori, Laurien
dc.contributor.authorWalker, James M.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:30:24Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:30:24Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56872-
dc.description.abstractAbundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2012,004en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD01en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen
dc.subject.keywordnetworksen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwStrafeen
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleBroken punishment networks in public goods games: Experimental evidence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn685082571en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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