Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56864
Authors: 
Steiger, Eva-Maria
Zultan, Roi
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2011,040
Abstract: 
Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a fully-transparent protocol in inducing cooperation under increasing returns to scale. In a comparable social dilemma, the information chain leads to high cooperation both when compared to a non-transparent protocol for early movers, and when compared to a fully-transparent protocol for late movers. we conclude that information chains facilitate cooperation by balancing positive and negative reciprocity.
Subjects: 
team production
public goods
incentives
externality
information
transparency
conditional cooperation
JEL: 
C72
C92
D21
J31
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
888.02 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.