Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56861
Autor:innen: 
Suzuki, Toru
Datum: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2012,014
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the effective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an effective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can 'backfire' and when it can be effective.
Schlagwörter: 
signaling game
consideration set
counter signaling
limited attention
marketing
advertising
JEL: 
D03
D82
D83
L15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
462.62 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.