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Autoren: 
Güth, Werner
Kliemt, Hartmut
Datum: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2011,016
Zusammenfassung: 
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a productive state. At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal profits according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.
Schlagwörter: 
unanimity in collective decision making
Buchanan
Wicksell
JEL: 
H4
H61
D62
D63
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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