Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56810
Authors: 
Fischbacher, Urs
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2011,059
Abstract: 
Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called point of no return, meaning that if the group's total contribution falls below this point, all payoffs are reduced. An individual faces the usual conflict between private and collective interests above the point of no return, while he incurs the risk of damaging everyone by not surpassing the point. Our data reveal that contributions are higher if the cost of not reaching the threshold is high. In particular if the signal is private, many subjects are not willing to provide the necessary contribution.
Subjects: 
public goods
provision point mechanism
experiments
reduction factor
signal
JEL: 
H41
C92
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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